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Abstract
There has been much recent discussion of the criticality of the 5G
infrastructure, and whether certain vendors should be able to supply
5G equipment. The key issue appears to be about trust, namely to
what degree the security and reliability properties of 5G equipment
and systems need to be trusted, and by whom, and how the necessary
level of trust might be obtained. In this paper, by considering existing
examples such as the Internet, the possible need for trust is examined
in a systematic way, and possible routes to gaining trust are described.
The issues that arise when a security and/or reliability failure actually
occurs are also discussed. The paper concludes with a discussion of
possible future ways of enabling all parties to gain the assurances they
need in a cost-effective and harmonised way.
1 Introduction
In recent months there has been much public discussion of the security prop-
erties of 5G mobile telecommunications systems, and in particular whether
certain suppliers should be permitted to provide 5G equipment — see, for
example, [2, 13, 20]. These, often rather fevered, discussions have often
taken place within a apparently political context. It is to be hoped that
in the longer run we can examine all the issues relating to the supply and
operation of communications equipment in a rather more dispassionate and
scientific way, and it is the author’s hope that this paper will contribute in
a small way to such a discussion. There are certainly important issues to be
considered, and the way forward is not always clear.
Discussions have often revolved around the word trust, a difficult concept
which forms the main theme of this paper. Much of the recent reporting
of the 5G issue has focussed on whether suppliers can be trusted (see, for
example, [14, 16]). Of course, the notion of trust has rather emotive con-
notations, and so we need to try to understand better what it might mean
for one party to trust another in the context of mobile telecommunications.
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This in turn leads us to the need to consider who might be the principal
actors in the global digital ecosystem, and what are their needs for trust?
Any such analysis needs to be performed in the context of the history of
global digital communications and existing trust-building measures.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. We start in §2
by briefly examining the meaning of the word trust. In §3 we consider
where trust is needed, i.e. in what situations trust is required and by and in
whom, and this leads naturally to §4, where the types of trust that might
be needed are discussed. Possible means of enabling trust are described in
§5, and the relevance of these for 5G is addressed in §6. The issue of what
happens when trust fails is the subject of §7. The final main section, §8,
contains a discussion of how possible frameworks for performing 5G trust
evaluations can support cost-effective decision-making in the future. The
paper concludes with a brief summary in §9.
2 What is trust?
The word ‘trust’ is very heavily used, and has a wide range of meanings —
see, for example, Voas [22]. Of course, for the purposes of this paper the
scope is much reduced. We adopt here the following definition, taken from
the ISO Online Browsing Platform1
degree to which a user or other stakeholder has confidence that
a product or system will behave as intended
(see ISO/IEC 25010:2011 [8]). That is, trust here is about the behaviour of
a product or system. Note that we are interested only in this rather narrow
interpretation of trust in a primarily business context — of course, there
has been a huge volume of work looking at trust from a psychological and
sociological perspective, including the work of Simmel [19].
In the context of security, trust is about behaviour relating to the con-
fidentiality and integrity of information assets handled by the product or
system, and/or the availability of the service provided. It seems clear that
these are precisely the issues that have caused so much recent concern, and
we therefore use this definition in the remainder of the paper.
Even when we restrict our attention to 5G, there are many aspects to
trust as defined above. The main focus of this paper is on the aspects of
trust that affect ‘long-term’ decision-making, e.g.
• what systems and products should network operators and other service
providers choose to use to provide their services;
1https://www.iso.org/obp/ui
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• which network operators and other service providers should be used to
provide important services, e.g. to support manufacturing or transport
services.
In many cases, the appropriate level of trust can be achieved using business-
related methods such as product certification and the establishment of ser-
vice level agreements and contracts (as discussed in greater detail in §5).
However, this ignores some very important trust-related issues, namely
those affecting more ‘short-term’ decision-making. Examples might include
deciding whether an end user should:
• employ a particular service at a specific time for a given purpose, e.g.
to send a security-critical message or to act on (trust) a received email;
• trust a transaction completed using a service provided by 5G technol-
ogy.
Providing the necessary level of trust for such decisions would appear to
be a technology-based issue, rather than a business/commercial one. That
is, the party required to make the decision may wish to see evidence that
the technology used to provide the service is suitable for the purpose. Such
technology might involve a wide range of techniques, including methods for
achieving distributed trust (e.g. block chain). A discussion of some of the key
issues has been provided in a recent survey by Ahmad et al. [1]. However,
we do not propose to discuss such issues further here.
3 Who needs to trust whom?
We start by considering the key stakeholders in any global communications
system, such as the Internet. These stakeholders can be divided into four
main categories:
• end users, both organisational and individual;
• equipment/system manufacturers, including software suppliers, a broad
category covering terminal manufacturers, manufacturers of network
infrastructure and providers of software used to enable network ser-
vices;
• network service providers, including not only ‘traditional’ network op-
erators but also a range of other network service providers; and
• regulatory and standardisation organisations, including governments,
government agencies and supranational organisations.
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The first three classes form the operational system, whereas the regula-
tors monitor and exert some control over the operation of the system from
outside. In principle at least, the trust relationships between the operational
stakeholders form a chain, with users needing to trust the service providers,
who in turn must trust both other service providers and the equipment
manufacturers. The regulators and standardisation bodies then trust all the
other parties to perform their roles in accordance with the established rules
and regulations.
4 What type of trust is needed?
We next consider how trust is established and managed between the various
stakeholders. Perhaps most significantly, it is important to realise that the
type and degree of trust required will vary widely depending on the nature
of the network or service, and what it is being used for. There are two types
of trust of particular relevance in a communications context.
• Security : how certain can I be that data sent and received is going
to/coming from the right entity and has not been interfered with?
• Reliability : how reliable is the network and/or service, i.e. how likely is
it to be available when needed, and what bandwidth and other service
level guarantees are there?
In the case of the Internet, for end users the level of trust in security is
not very high at all; indeed, encryption at the application layer encryption
or immediately below (e.g. as provided by Transport Layer Security (TLS)
[18]) is routinely used to protect web traffic. This is very reasonable since
end users are offered no guarantees about how their data will be routed and
what third parties might have access to it. For example, many of us routinely
use third-party-provided Wi-Fi, e.g. in airports or coffee shops, and we have
no control over (or knowledge about) who is providing the service and who
may be monitoring or interfering with the traffic. The only option is to
use TLS and/or Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) for all sensitive traffic.
Similar issues arise with use of mobile communications networks, where
trusting the network requires not only trusting the network provider (often
a completely unknown quantity when roaming) and also trusting that the
physical network infrastructure has not been compromised.
The level of reliability for end users is also highly variable, typically
depending on the type of network used to access the Internet. For exam-
ple, home users may experience much reduced bandwidth at peak times,
where a single network link is shared amongst many premises. Similarly,
the quality of access via Wi-Fi may depend on a range of factors and may
vary dynamically. For mobile networks of all generations (including 5G),
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there are inherent limits to the quality of service, since no network guaran-
tees universal coverage and connectivity may also be lost in times of peak
demand.
As far as service providers are concerned, the level of trust in Internet
security when working with other service providers is also likely to be very
low, since the Internet relies on a loose collaboration between entities and
is not subject to tight regulatory control. The level of security trust in
equipment manufacturers is not an issue that has been addressed to any
great extent. There have been occasions when manufacturers have been
accused of deliberately installing security backdoors in their equipment (see,
for example, Lee [15]), but this is not an issue that has been widely explored.
Finally, the role of regulators on the operation of the Internet appears to
be very limited. That is, the required level of trust by regulators in service
providers and manufacturers is generally low. Of course, the Internet Engi-
neering Task Force (IETF)2 plays a key role in setting technical standards
for the Internet, and IANA3 manages functions such as IP address alloca-
tion. However, in general there is no regulation governing the procurement
of equipment to provide the Internet infrastructure.
In summary, at least as far as the Internet is concerned, we appear to
be starting from a relatively low trust base, i.e. users and service providers
employ and operate the Internet without high levels of trust. This situation
is perhaps rather surprising when one considers the degree on which so many
aspects of modern life rely on the Internet. Instead of demanding a perhaps
unrealisable level of trustworthiness in the Internet, we rely on a range of
mitigations, including providing security on a case by case basis (e.g. using
TLS or Secure Shell (SSH) [23]), and exploiting redundancy of various types
— including having a multitude of access methods, e.g. via fixed, public Wi-
Fi or mobile networks, and multiple possible routes between end points.
Whether this situation is reasonable in the long term remains to be seen.
Certainly the Internet as currently implemented is easily made unavailable
by state actors, e.g. in times of war, as past experience shows.
5 How do we enable trust?
There would appear to be three main instruments by which the necessary
levels of trust can be established:
• through contractual agreements and SLAs;
• through assessments of the reputation (trustworthiness) of the suppler;
and
2https://www.ietf.org/
3https://www.iana.org/
• via product assurance mechanisms (including product certifications).
For end users the first two mechanisms are key as far as network service is
concerned — although the assurance mechanism is, of course, relevant to the
provision of user terminals (handsets). The level of security and reliability
of service guaranteed via contract will typically be low. That is, service
contracts will typically not guarantee any particular level of availability or
data throughput. Of course, even if guarantees are available with respect
to local access, this does not mean that there are any guarantees about
end-to-end network security or reliability since this will almost certainly be
out of the control of the provider of network access. Similar limitations
apply to the use of reputation — certainly the usefulness of reputation as a
measure of service reliability or security is very limited; indeed, with respect
to security, it may be of no value at all, since most users will have no idea
of how secure their network use is, and to be useful a service’s reputation
requires existing users to be able to give an informed assessment.
For service providers, the degree to which contractual agreements and
reputation help them in gaining trust with respect to equipment manufac-
turers is moot. One might reasonably assume that the terms of purchase
are pretty much the same for all suppliers, and it is not clear to what degree
the major infrastructure equipment manufacturers have varying reputations.
This leads naturally to consideration of product certification.
Product assurance via certification has many different aspects. Certain
products and services are critical for wider society and, as a result, the
need for certification is very high; however, the failure of other products
might be unfortunate, but less serious, and hence the need for certification
is lower. The degree to which a purchaser depends on the technology should
be established before the need for product certification can be assessed.
There is clearly a need for purchasers of telecommunications products
to be assured regarding their security properties, where products include
handsets, USIMs (including embedded and virtual) and infrastructure. This
typically involves certifications of products against standards, a role the
Global Certification Forum (GCF)4 has performed for parts of the mobile
industry. However, GCF certifications are mainly focussed on testing func-
tionality/interoperability, rather than providing guarantees about security
resilience.
More generally, over the last 40 years standardised techniques and pro-
cesses have been developed to enable consumers to gain confidence in the
security properties of IT products and systems — for a helpful review see
Chapter 16 of Kizza [11]. Of particular importance are the Common Criteria
standards (ISO/IEC 15408 [7, 5, 6]) which specify how testing laboratories
can test and certify products so that purchasers and users can be confident
4https://www.globalcertificationforum.org/
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that: (a) products do what they should, and, perhaps even more impor-
tantly, (b) they don’t do what they should not. However, gaining certifica-
tion for a product under the common criteria can be costly, time-consuming,
and there are problems with mutual recognition of certifications — see, for
example, Kallberg [10]. As a result, new mobile-industry-specific approaches
are being developed by 3GPP (SECAM/SCAS)5 and GSMA (NESAS)6 to
provide evaluation processes suitable for 5G products and systems.
Recent public concern over the security properties of certain 5G sys-
tems emphasises the lack of a universally agreed method by which assur-
ance can be gained in the security properties of products. National and
vendor-specific approaches, such as the UK’s industry-leading Huawei Cy-
ber Security Evaluation Centre (HCSEC) (see the 2019 annual report [21]),
are clearly not globally scalable, not least because of the stringent require-
ments, high cost and major delays inherent in such an approach. As a result
internationally recognised, generally applicable, approaches are needed.
In the context of 5G, the hardware is often discussed, but it is actually
the software that is the real key component of the network. This constitutes
a problem when certifying a product, as software changes regularly, not least
as a result of automatic updates and patches. Certification will never be the
silver bullet that will address the trust issue once and for all, but could be
of great help providing it is conducted appropriately.
Finally, it is also worth mentioning the notion of zero trust networks, as
discussed in detail in draft NISP SP 800-207 [17]. As stated there, ‘zero trust
security models assume that an attacker is present in the network’ so that
security measures include ‘minimizing access to resources (such as data and
compute resources and applications) to only those users and assets identified
as needing access as well as continually authenticating and authorizing the
identity and security posture of each access request’. Clearly adoption of a
zero trust approach can reduce the need to trust individual elements of a
large network whilst increasing resilience, but (a) the architecture needs to
be built into the specifications for system interfaces, and (b) the need for
additional authentication and authorisation will almost inevitably increase
complexity and cost. This appears to be very much a long-term solution,
that has relatively little relevance for 5G. Indeed, the ideas are still very
much at an experimental/research stage — see, for example, Eidle et al. [3].
6 Trust for 5G
It is clear that, until now, the level of trust in the security and reliability of
the Internet, and in particular in mobile telecommunications, is low. Whilst
this may sound disturbing, the good news is that this has not prevented
5https://www.3gpp.org/news-events/3gpp-news/1569-secam_for_3gpp_nodes
6https://www.gsma.com/security/network-equipment-security-assurance-scheme/
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many of us enjoying the huge range of applications built on the Internet
in many aspects of our daily lives. We have obtained the degree of trust
we need by building mitigations on top of the base level of communications
that are provided. Of course, as we are told very regularly, 5G changes
everything, and so we need to consider how our trust requirements will
evolve as 5G becomes more pervasive. Some of the key trust issues for 5G
are summarised in the recent article by Kshetri and Voas [12].
5G promises to become fundamental to many functions of society, includ-
ing automated manufacturing, autonomous vehicles, and edge computing.
More specifically, a much wider range of industry verticals, each with differ-
ent value chains, will be involved in 5G than in past generations of mobile
telecommunications. Moreover, the historic concentration on business to
consumer (B2C) applications will expand to include many different types
of business to business (B2B) applications, including deployment in critical
infrastructure operations. In the fields of car sharing and mobility provision,
for example, the 5G-connected ecosystem will span providers of rental cars
and mobility services, manufacturers of cars and mobile terminals, mobile
telecommunications operators, application providers, and the manufacturers
of smart cards. These changes will create major new challenges for govern-
ments, industry organisations, individual ecosystem members (operators,
vendors, etc.), and academia.
For governments, the most significant question is whether and how they
should regulate the 5G industry. What should be decided by government and
what should be decided by the market? For industry organizations, many
questions arise regarding the boundaries of responsibilities, expectations,
power and rights for each stakeholder in the ecosystem. As a result, the
degree to which society relies on its existence will continue to increase.
The increased need for assurance in system and product functionality has
given rise to a major growth of interest in, and development of, methods of
certification of telecommunications products and systems. One reason why
certification has recently arisen as a major issue stems from the belief that
5G is transformative, and that citizens in Europe and around the world will
be increasingly reliant on this technology. As a result, the need for trust and
certification is becoming progressively higher. Whilst this is certainly not a
negative development, it is a little curious that the question of certification
has not been a major issue previously. Indeed, 4G is also widely relied on,
and yet there is no unified European certification scheme for it.
As far as recent developments on certification are concerned, the EU
Cybersecurity Act [4] provides a framework for the European Union to har-
monise the way certification is conducted; it will probably also be adopted by
those outside the EU who wish to follow a similar path. For 5G specifically,
there are a number of initiatives, including GSMA’s NESAS and the work
of 3GPP including in particular the creation of a range of SCAS’s (Secu-
rity Assurance Specifications for specific products). More debate is needed
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on how the different aspects can fit together, what the levels of criticalities
are, and the degree to which certification is needed. Ideally a harmonised
base-line of certification, based on the Cybersecurity Act for both 5G infras-
tructure and consumer products, would be established across the EU. This
could then be built on at the national level, as well as providing a reference
level for countries outside the EU. Of course, there is still a long way to
go to reach this aim, although many of us hope that a base-line level of
certification will be in place sooner than one might think.
In parallel to the use of certification as a way of enhancing trust, another
key approach involves diversification of supply. That is, if equipment can
be procured from more than supplier, then the odds of the entire network
failing simultaneously is much reduced. Of course, the degree to which
this can reduce the risk of a major failure depends on the nature of the
equipment; some functions are critical to the entire network, and if they fail
then the entire network fails. Generally speaking, trying to minimise the
risk of reliability failure requires redundancy, which in turn increases cost.
This raises an interesting question — if regulators require service providers to
install more equipment than necessary to provide a service, and/or purchase
equipment from multiple vendors, then this will clearly increase costs for the
service provider; who will pay?
Some regulatory bodies have already taken the decision to require 5G
service providers to avoid over-dependency on a single supplier, notably in
the case of the UK government’s recent decision to limit one supplier to 35%
of the total in a network (see Sweeney, [20]). If course, this decision could
also be seen as a move to provide financial support to other suppliers.
Finally, it is interesting to observe that the drive for certification schemes
as a means of enhancing trust in the provision of network equipment appears
to be coming from regulatory and other government bodies, rather than
from service providers — i.e. the actual purchasers of equipment. Many
government bodies see their role as to require service providers to ensure a
high level of trustworthiness in their service, above what they might need
to meet their contractual obligations to customers. This presumably arises
from a belief that that the mobile communications infrastructure is a critical
national infrastructure, and hence something whose reliability must be pro-
tected by government. If this assumption is true, it is surprising that similar
considerations are not applied to the other parts of the Internet communi-
cations system, since if any significant part of the Internet fails then the
effects will be very significant.
7 What happens when things go wrong?
We conclude this discussion of trust by considering what happens when
things go wrong; that is, what happens when the expected level of security
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or reliability is not met. Who is responsible for picking up the pieces? Of
course, this depends on which party has been let down, although we focus
here primarily on the service providers, since end users have little recourse
apart from pursuing claims for compensation because of a failure to meet
contractual obligations.
In general, this is a key issue relating to trust. One can think of trust as
influencing decisions as to what equipment and/or software to buy (notably
by service providers), and also influencing decisions by regulators as to what
equipment service providers and others are permitted to buy. However, once
the systems have been procured and are operating, we also need to think
about what might happen if the equipment fails, where failure here covers
both ceasing to function (loss of reliability) and loss of security, e.g. enabling
large scale leaking of data.
Whilst a reliability breach will be immediately obvious, a security breach
may be much less so. Nonetheless, if data is leaked by equipment on a large
scale then this is likely to be detected. Of course, such matters are typically
managed through contracts, and in the event of the failure of a single piece
of equipment this is clearly something that can be managed in the usual way.
However, a major concern for all parties must be if a large number of pieces
of equipment all fail at the same time. This could happen in many ways,
e.g. as a result of criminal hackers or state actors exploiting vulnerabilities
in software.
There would thus be two main ways in which an equipment manufacturer
might ultimately be responsible for such a breach:
• through negligence, e.g. by leaving an exploitable vulnerability in a
product because of poor software engineering practices, or
• through deliberately including some kind of back door in equipment
which enables a third party to gain unauthorised access to data or to
cause equipment to stop functioning.
After a major breach investigations may reveal which of the two is the cause
(although it is possible that a back door could be engineered to look like an
accidental vulnerability).
If the breach is very serious, the reputation of the supplier is likely to
be badly damaged whichever of the two causes is true. Of course, if an
equipment manufacturer is ever found to be guilty of deliberately enabling
a security or reliability failure, then their reputation and hence their trust
will be damaged possibly beyond repair. However, if the system that fails is
‘critical infrastructure’ then maybe the damage will already have been done,
which explains the concerns of some governments and regulators. Their
primary concern is probably to ensure that the possibility and scope of
major failures can be minimised, in advance of any problems.
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8 Possible trust frameworks
There are well-established risk-based ways of determining how to achieve
appropriate trade-offs between the need for security and the desire to make
cost-effective investments — see, for example, the ISO/IEC 27001 informa-
tion security management system [9]. The fundamental idea is to base all
decisions on an assessment of risk. In the context of trust, this means de-
ciding on the degree of trust required in a 5G system component based on
an assessment of the risks arising from a security failure.
For example, a system component that is critical to the operation of an
entire network would have a high level of risk associated with it, and would
therefore require a high level of trust in the component. As a result, a man-
ufacturer might be required to obtain certification for the product or system
which involved rigorous examination of the hardware and software, and the
reputation of the supplier would also need to be high. Alternatively, a prod-
uct with minimal access to sensitive data (meaning that confidentiality and
integrity risks are low), and with minimal impact on the availability of the
system, might only require a low level of trust. In principle, such evalua-
tions could be performed by every acquirer of equipment, but in practice it
is unreasonable to expect every party to have the necessary expertise.
How can such a situation be addressed? One possibility would be to
define a standardised framework for making such assessments. This could
have a number of advantages.
• It would de-skill the task of evaluating the level of trust required in a
system to be procured.
• It would mean that the process of trust evaluation could be done in
a uniform way across the industry, meaning that regulators could rely
on individual companies making decisions in a recognised way.
• Regulators could stipulate requirements for product assurance to all
organisations within its remit, using a standardised terminology and
framework.
• It would help to support standardisation of the means of acquiring
trust, e.g. through product or system evaluations and certifications,
or through provision of evidence regarding the product development
lifecycle. Such standardisation would potentially significantly reduce
costs for equipment and system manufacturers, in that they would not
be required to provide evidence to enable trust in a different form for
each customer.
One such framework is currently at an early stage of development, namely
ITU-T X.5GSec-t7, Security framework based on trust relationship for 5G
7https://www.itu.int/md/T17-SG17-200317-C/en
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ecosystem, being produced by SG17. However, unfortunately, the latest
draft from March 20208 is not publicly available. The role of this draft
standard, work on which started in 2018, is discussed in a 2019 presentation
[24].
There are potentially three different facets of such a framework.
• Governmental Responsibilities: What should be managed, controlled,
planned by governments, and what should be decided by the market?
Are there any fundamental principles that each government needs to
follow?
• Industry Organisation Responsibilities: To what degree and how should
industry organisations work within an industry ecosystem governance
framework? How should the framework manage the boundaries of
responsibility, power and rights of each stakeholder in the industry
ecosystem?
• Technology : If governments and industry organisations are able to
find ways to work together effectively, perhaps the technology-specific
aspects will prove comparatively easy (or at least not too difficult)?
Within a system with clear boundaries of responsibility, power and
rights, maybe the market can choose the most appropriate security
solutions based on customer requirements?
There are clearly more questions here than answers, and much further work
is needed to resolve some of these key issues.
9 Summary and conclusions
We have considered the role of trust in relationships between key parties
in the 5G ecosystem; we have also examined ways in which such trust can
be provided. In general it is likely to be difficult for the large numbers
of players in the ecosystem to understand the degree to which they need
to trust their suppliers, and also how they might gain the degree of trust
that they require. The absence of the appropriate levels of knowledge and
trust could seriously distort the market, and costs for all parties could be
significantly higher than they need to be. In conclusion, the notion of a
framework for developing an understanding the necessary trust levels, and
the way in which trust can be developed, was introduced, and the existence
of efforts in the standardisation community to meet this need was noted.
This is clearly an area where considerably more work is urgently needed.
8https://www.itu.int/md/T17-SG17-C-0821/en
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